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Sickness absence has been found to vary substantially across geographical areas. There are 
large differences between different countries but also between different regions within a 
particular country. In the literature some of these observed differentials have been suggested 
to stem from differences in local norms with regard to the legitimacy of living off benefits. 
The aim of our study is to investigate the effect of geographical and presumed cultural context 
on sickness absence. In order to identify this effect we compare changes in sickness related 
absence for individuals who move from one Swedish region to another with those occurring 
when individuals move within Swedish regions. Our results indicate that the region of 
residence is important to the individual sickness related absence. Moreover, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that the observed patterns are caused by local cultures regarding sickness 
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1 Introduction 
The levels of sickness absence vary substantially between different countries but also across 
regions within a particular country. Some of these variations have been attributed to varying 
sickness insurance systems giving rise to differences in economic incentives. These 
explanations are however, not sufficient for explaining any of the within-country variations or 
all of the between-country variations. Other explanations such as differences in organizational 
and demographic structure shed some light on the remaining differentials but even after taking 
these factors into consideration there is still much to be explained. One idea put forth in the 
sickness absence literature is that the large variations stem from differences in norms 
regarding the utilization of the welfare system. If attitudes towards living off benefits are 
positive, an individual is more prone to accept help from society as compared to countries 
where attitudes towards benefits are negative.  
 
Data reveals also that Sweden is characterized by large geographical variations in the levels of 
sickness absence. Absence rates tend to be higher in northern Sweden and in rural areas as 
compared to in southern Sweden and in more densely populated regions. Some of the 
geographical divergences can be explained by differences in the demographic and industrial 
structure. However, large differences remain even after taking these characteristics into 
consideration (Dutrieux and Sjöholm 2003; Lundberg 2006). The remaining regional 
differentials in sickness absence have been attributed to differences in approach and 
organizational culture within the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (SSIA) (SOU 2000), as 
well as to cultural diversity regarding the legitimacy of benefits across regions (Palmer 2006).  
  
Attitudes toward sickness benefits as a mean of livelihood vary among citizens, doctors and 
insurance officers throughout the country and are believed to cause sickness absence to differ 
across regions (Olsson (2006). This phenomenon has been labeled “cultural illness” 
(Lindbeck et al. 2004; Frykman and Hansen 2005). The term suggests that different norms 
regarding legitimate absence behavior, due to illness, prevail in different parts of the country.  
As a consequence, individuals with otherwise similar characteristics utilize the sickness 
insurance system differently, depending on where in the country they live. Even though the 
term “cultural illness” has been used quite frequently in the public debate, only a few studies 
have put this possible phenomenon to the test (Frykman and Hansen 2008; Lindbeck et al. 




The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of geographical and presumed cultural 
context on sickness absence. In order to identify this effect we compare changes in sickness 
related absence for individuals who move from one Swedish region to another, with those 
occurring when individuals move within Swedish regions. A region is defined as a cluster of 
municipalities which are similar with respect to certain geographical, political and economical 
characteristics. In this way we associate municipalities with presumably similar norms 
regarding the legitimacy of living off benefits. We study individuals who moved in the years 
1996 to 1998 and evaluate the effect of changing regions in 1999 to 2005. A difference-in-
differences (DiD) matching estimator is used to evaluate the variations in change of average 
days of sickness related absence between the groups. Our study will contribute to existing 
literature on sickness absence and social norms by explicitly investigating the effect of 
sickness absence when moving between regions. Moreover, adherence to new norms is likely 
to happen gradually. Our study is the first to evaluate the effects of moving from one region to 
another over a series of years rather than only immediately after the move.  
 
Our results suggest that individuals who move from regions with a low (high) absence rate to 
regions with a high (low) level increase (decrease) their sickness related absence as compared 
to those who move within the region. This indicates that the geographical location is 
important to the individual sickness related absence. We find the effect to be immediate but 
increasing over time, indicating that the assimilation to new norms happens gradually. We 
cannot rule out the possibility that these patterns are caused by local cultures regarding 
sickness absence and the existence of a so called “cultural illness”. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the theoretical and empirical 
motivation behind the study. Section 3 outlines the hypotheses and the methodology. Data is 
presented in Section 4. The results are reported in Section 5 and, finally, Section 6 concludes 
the paper.  
 
 
2 Social norms and economic outcomes 
 
Culture can be defined as “the way of life of an entire society” (Jary and Jary 1995). Members 
of the same cultural context share norms, beliefs and values and have common patterns of 
behavior.  Individuals live, act and make decisions within their local context and variations in 
2 
  
local cultures and norms could cause individuals, as well as entire communities and regions 
with otherwise similar characteristics, to behave and evolve differently (Rao and Walton 
2004). 
  
2.1 Norms regarding absence 
The absence literature recognizes that individual absence decisions might depend on the 
social context (Kaiser 1998). People’s absence behavior is influenced by how it is judged by 
others. When a large number of individuals is absent, such behavior is likely to be more excepted 
than would otherwise be the case. The larger the number of people who is absent the less 
stigmatized is the absent individual. In the absence literature, the term “absence culture” 
(Chadwick-Jones et al. 1982) has been used to denote the social consensus in a society or 
organization regarding the legitimacy of nonworking behavior, including being absent from 
work. Johns and Nicholson (1982) define absence culture as “the established ‘custom and 
practice’ of employee absence behaviour”. According to Johns and Nicholson (1985) the 
nature of absence cultures on a societal level depends on both attitudes towards absence (i.e. 
which causes of absence are acceptable) and assumptions about employment (i.e. which 
obligations and rights does an employee and citizen have).  
 
In line with Johns and Nicholson’s theories concerning absence cultures, Swedish 
ethnologists and political scientists argue that cultural differences exist between regions in 
Sweden, and affect the absence rates. Frykman and Hansen (2008) compare the situation of 
two Swedish counties, Kronoberg and Jämtland. Kronoberg is characterized by low levels of 
sickness absence, while the levels in Jämtland are high. The analysis, which is based on 
interviews with citizens, politicians and local SSIA officials, reveals that different norms 
regarding work, leisure and the acceptance of living off benefits have developed in the two 
counties. The researchers argue that these differences have emerged because of differences in 
historical and economical features in the civic society. Moreover, Frykman and Hansen 
(2005) conclude that the performance of institutions set up by the national government is not 
neutral to the regional setting. The citizens’ use of the sickness insurance system depends on 
the prevailing norms within the region. When studying the process of medicalization
1 of 
sickness absence, Schierenbeck (2010) finds that local cultures and contexts affect the 
judgment of both administrators within the SSIA and physicians responsible for issuing 
                                                 
1 Medicalization describes a process by which previously defined non-medical problems become defined and 
treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses or disorders. 
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medical certificates. She concludes that values and attitudes regarding what kind of illness is 
considered legitimate (and thus eligible to sick leave benefits and disability pension) differ 
both depending on time and region.  
 
2.2 Local cultures in the economic context 
In the economic literature incorporation of the social interplay in models for economic 
decision making is still a relatively new phenomenon. Since neither culture nor social norms 
are traditional economic variables their importance has been overlooked by economists (Sen 
2004). In recent years, however, the strand of both theoretical and empirical literature 
combining economic decisions, social interactions and social norms has increased 
substantially; see Manski (2000); Dietz (2002); Soetevent (2006) for reviews.  By extending 
the individual’s utility function also to include social concerns economists have been able to 
incorporate the importance of social norms for economic outcomes. For example, Lindbeck 
and Persson (2008) include social norms in a theoretical model regarding individual absence 
behavior. It is assumed that the social norm is to work rather than to live off benefits. 
Individuals acting in a way that does not conform to the norm (i.e. those absent and living off 
benefits) are stigmatized. The strength of the norm, and hence the magnitude of the social cost 
inflicted on absent individuals, can in this model be either exogenous or endogenous. In the 
case of endogenous norms the strength of the norm depends on the number of absent people. 
The discomfort felt by the individual living off benefits is higher (lower) when the proportion 
of people upholding the norm is higher (lower). Hence, when individuals make their decisions 
about working or not they take the behavior of all other individuals into consideration. 
Individual behavior is thus amplified by group influence.  
 
Performing an empirical investigating of the importance of local norms for individual 
behavior is rather challenging since measures of norms are rarely available to the researcher. 
Nevertheless there is a number of empirical studies which try to explore the relationship 
between existing local norms and various economic outcomes. Most studies investigate this 
relationship implicitly by exploring similarities and differences in people’s behavior within 
and between geographical areas. Using data on individuals working for an Italian bank, Ichino 
and Maggi (2000) study differences in work absence between workers in southern and 
northern Italy. After controlling for a number of work place as well as regional characteristics 
it appears that the average absence level is higher in the south than in the north. These results 
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support the view that individual absence depends on the norm regarding work absence in the 
region.  
 
Another way to deduce the impact of local norms is to explore the behavioral changes of 
individuals who move from one geographical area to another. Ichino and Maggi (2000) find 
that bank employees who move from one bank branch to another adjust their absence 
behavior to that of the new branch. In a Swedish study, Lindbeck et al. (2007) study 
individuals in Sweden who move from one residential area to another. Their results show, 
similarly to the Ichino and Maggi study, how individuals adjust their short-term sickness 





3.1 Identifying strategy and hypotheses 
To receive sickness benefits in Sweden three separate decisions must be made. The first 
decision is made by the individual when he/she considers himself/herself incapable of 
working. Secondly, a physician makes a professional evaluation of the individual’s health 
status. Thirdly, a SSIA official determines if the health status is serious enough to prevent the 
individual from working. Each of these three decisions is likely to be influenced by the local 
culture. 
 
Directly measuring the effect of local cultures on sickness absence requires data that enables 
identification of differences in people’s attitudes towards living off sickness benefits. Because 
of lack of data on beliefs and preferences we seek to indirectly estimate the effect of local 
cultures on sickness absence. If we assume that observed differences in sickness absence 
across regions to some extent reflect differences in social norms, we expect rational 
individuals who move from one region to another to adjust their behavior accordingly. In 
addition, norms among physicians and SSIA officials evaluating health status and work 
capacity are likely to vary depending on region. Based on the theoretical predictions in the 
model by Lindbeck and Persson (2008) and earlier empirical findings, e.g. Ichino and Maggi 
(2000) and Lindbeck et al. (2007), we expect individuals who move from regions with low 
(high) rates of absence due to sickness to regions with high (low) levels to increase (decrease) 
their sickness absence as compared to if they had never moved. Adherence to new norms and 
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a new culture is likely to develop gradually as the individual adapts to the new society. 
However, an individual’s exposure to new norms among physicians and SSIA officials is 
immediate. We thus expect the effect on sickness absence to be immediate but increasing over 
time.  
 
In order to evaluate the effect of moving from one region to another we would need a control 
group consisting of individuals similar to those who move from one region to another. 
However, the purpose of this study is not to evaluate the effect of moving per se, but rather to 
evaluate the effect of changing local context. Given this and the possibility that movers in 
their own right could differ in mentality and other characteristics from individuals who do not 
move, the latter are ruled out as a good set of controls. Instead, we define as our set of 
controls the group of individuals who move but do not change local context. More 
specifically, our set of controls consists of individuals who move within the region.
2 By 
comparing the trajectory of sickness absence in the group of individuals moving from one 
region to another with the trajectory of sickness absence for those who move within their 




In evaluation studies, the counterfactual outcome (i.e. what would have happened if the 
individual had not been treated) is of main interest.
3 Let   be the outcome of individual   
and   be an indicator of whether individual i has been treated or not, such that the 
outcome given treatment is denoted by   and outcome given no treatment is denoted by  . 




1 i Y i Y
 
10 ii YY Δ= − . 
 
In reality, an individual has either been treated or not been treated, implying that for each 
individual, only   or   is observed. The counterfactual outcome is thus unknown to the  1 i Y 0 i Y
                                                 
2 Moving within the region implies moving across a municipality boarder within the region. 
3 In this study treatment corresponds to moving from one region to another (See section 4.3 for a detailed 
description of regions) as compared to moving within the region. The counterfactual outcome corresponds to the 
sickness related absence for an individual that have moved between regions, would he/she have moved within 
the region.    
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researcher. In the literature this problem of missing data has been dealt with in several ways. 
In case of non-experimental data, methods such as IV-estimation, Heckman’s selection model 
and the matching estimator are commonly used. Recent econometric research suggests that 
matching is a more efficient method as compared to regression-based methods in reducing the 
selection bias present in almost all studies relying on observational data (Heckman et al. 
(1997), Smith and Todd (2005). Selection bias in the setting of evaluation studies refers to the 
discrepancy in characteristics between treated and controls that influence both treatment and 
the outcome variable of interest. 
 
Matching is a non-parametric method that deals with the problem of missing data by enabling 
the researcher to identify a suitable control group for the group of treated. The main purpose 
of matching is to remove the selection bias by finding a matching individual in the non-
treatment group for every individual in the treatment group. The outcome for individuals in 
the control group will then serve as proxies for the missing counterfactuals in the treatment 
group.   
 
Identification of the control group in the matching procedure is based on a set of 
characteristics,Z , important both to the probability of treatment and to the outcome variable.
4 
Individuals in the treatment group are matched with individuals in the non-treatment group 
based on this set of observable characteristics. Following the seminal paper by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) the observed characteristics are used to predict the probability of group 
membership, using either a probit or logit model. Based on this the so called “propensity 
score”, i.e. the probability of being treated conditional on Z , matching is performed. 
Individuals in the treatment and control group, with similar probabilities of being in the 
treatment group, are matched together.  
 
In the model estimating the propensity score only covariates that influence both treatment and 
the outcome variable should be included. The choice of which covariates to include is based 
on economic theory as well as on previous empirical results (Smith and Todd 2005). To 
ensure that all covariates used in the propensity score model are unaffected by treatment they 
should either be fixed over time or measured prior to treatment.  
 
                                                 
4 In this study, Z  is a set of variables that are important to the moving decision as well as to the level of 
sickness related absence. 
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Having estimated the propensity score, there are several methods used to match the treated 
with the non-treated
5 (Bryson et al. 2002; Baser 2006). Alternative matching procedures 
differ in how the neighborhood observations, i.e. observations in treatment and control groups 
having similar probability of being in the treatment group, are defined and in how weights for 
each observation are constructed.  
 
Once the treatment and the control groups have been identified, the effect of treatment can be 
evaluated. The most commonly used estimator is often referred to as simply “the matching 
estimator” and measures the effect on the outcome in levels. Following the notation of Smith 
and Todd (2005), this estimator can be written as:  
      
1
 1
    1         ,   0 
   0
 





where  1 I  and  0 I  denotes the set of treated and non-treated, respectively,  P S  is the set of 
common support,   is the number of individuals in the set  1 n 1 P I S ∩  and    ,   is the chosen 
weighting system.
6 In order for the matching estimator to be valid, the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA) has to hold. The CIA implies that, conditional on Z , the 
outcome variable is independent of treatment.  Unfortunately, there is no direct method for a 
researcher with only non-experimental data at hand to test the plausibility of the CIA 
assumption. However, in the work by Heckman et al. (1998) the assumption supporting the 
matching estimator is tested using non-experimental control groups in combination with 
experimental data. Their conclusion is rejection of the CIA assumption. Instead, they find that 
the weaker assumption underlying the DiD matching estimator is much more plausible. This 
weaker assumption allows for time-invariant differences in unobservables between treatment 
and control group individuals. As the name indicates the DiD matching estimator evaluates 
the treatment effect in differences rather than in levels.  The impact of treatment is measured 
as the difference between changes in average outcomes for treated individuals and changes in 
average outcomes for control group members, where the changes are measured relative to 
some benchmark time period. The estimator can be applied when longitudinal or repeated 
                                                 
5 Nearest neighbor matching, Stratified matching, Radius matching, Kernel matching and Mahalanobis matching 
are some examples. 
6 Common support denotes the region of overlap of propensity score for treated and controls. It has been shown 
that matching is valid only on the region of common support. 
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cross-sectional data is available to the researcher. Given longitudinal data the estimator can be 
written as: 
        
1
 1
     1      1            ,    0      0    
   0   
 




Even though there is no direct method of testing the assumptions behind the DiD matching 
estimatorthere are a number of techniques for testing the quality of the matching in terms of 
observables. Some commonly used tests checking the balance between treated and controls 
are paired t-tests for covariates entering the propensity score model, check of standardized 
bias over all covariates and investigation of the pseudo 
2 R . Lack of balance between groups 
after matching indicates that the model estimating the probability of being treated is not 





The analysis in this paper is based on data provided by Statistics Sweden. The data obtained 
from the LISA database contains a large number of socioeconomic variables for all 
individuals aged 16 and older for the years 1995 to 2005. 
 
4.1 Sample construction 
The sample used in the analysis includes individuals who moved from one municipality to 
another during the time period 1996-1998
7, either within one of the specified regions or 
across those regions. We compare individuals who move from one region to another with 
individuals who have moved within the region. Both groups of individuals are evaluated every 
year after the move until the year 2005. This means that the average time of living in the new 
region for individuals in the treatment group is approximately eight years. Each year subsequent 
to the time of movement the treatment and control groups somewhat decreases (people move 
to other municipalities and regions, leave the country or die) and the composition of both 
groups changes. All analyses are therefore based on the sample of treated and controls where 
all individuals have continued to live in the same region after their move.  
                                                 




In order to increase the share of individuals in the sample entitled to sickness benefits, 
individuals below the age of 25 are removed. Furthermore, individuals who reach the retiring 
age before the end of the evaluation period are excluded from the sample. The sample only 
includes individuals who are aged 25 to 55 at the time of the move. 
 
Due to large differences in the patterns of sickness related absence between men and women 
as well as differences regarding conditions of employment, men and women are treated 
separately in the analyses. 
 
4.2 The outcome variable 
The outcome variable corresponds to the sum of days of sickness cash benefits and the 
number of days on disability pension. We have chosen to name this variable “sickness related 
absence”. Even though mere sickness absence is a more common outcome variable in the 
absence literature, there are at least two reasons why the variable “sickness related absence” is 
a better option in our particular setting. Firstly, the sick leave insurance and disability pension 
insurance are the two most comprehensive programs in the Swedish sickness insurance 
system. The number of days with either sickness cash benefits or disability pension 
corresponds to approximately 99 per cent of the so called “sick rate”, a measure used by the 
SSIA to summarize all absences in Sweden caused by sickness. Secondly, over time 
individuals tend to move across different programs in the social insurance system. For 
example, individuals who have been on sick leave for a long period of time tend to end up 
receiving income compensation from the disability pension insurance. Examining only 
benefits from one program ignores regional differences in the propensity to transfer people 
from one program in the social insurance system to another, which in turn could hamper the 
analyses.
8    
 
A review of the sickness insurance system and the most important changes that have taken 
place during the time period of interest in this paper can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
                                                 
8 For example, in the municipality of Överkalix in northern Sweden the average number of days of sickness cash 
benefits has for several years been below both regional and national averages. The number of days of income 
compensation from the disability pension insurance, however, is among the highest in the country.   
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The number of days of sickness related absence is a highly skewed variable. For any given 
year during the time period of this study, 80 to 90 per cent of all individuals have no sickness 
related absence at all. Awareness of this feature is important when we try to understand and 
interpret differences in the average number of days of sickness related absence across groups 
and over time. A higher average number of days of sickness related absence can imply two 
things: either a larger share of individuals are on sick leave and/or receive benefits from the 
disability pension insurance or those receiving benefits have longer spells of absence. 
 
4.3 Regions 
A region is defined as a geographical area with certain characteristics that separates it from 
other areas. Regions can be formed on the basis of administrative purposes, historical roots, 
social conditions, economic performance, distinctive geographical attributes and/or cultural 
expressions and traditions (Castensson 1994; Törnqvist 1998). Today, there is no unanimous 
division of Sweden into different regions. Instead, all existing classifications are made 
depending on purpose. Using any of the existing regional groupings in our study is therefore 
somewhat arbitrary. Using the existing administrative classification, i.e. counties or even 
groups of counties, ignores the differentials in socio-economic conditions as well as absence 
behavior that exist across municipalities within the same counties. Forming regions on the 
basis of absence patterns is also problematic since absence is the outcome variable in our 
analysis. In our study we have chosen to form regions by collecting municipalities that are 
similar with respect to certain geographical, political and economical characteristics. More 
specifically the regions are formed on the basis of four dichotomous variables; voting patterns 
in the referendum concerning a Swedish membership in the European Union (EU)
9 and the 
national elections
10, being a metropolitan area
11 or not, and the relative importance of the 
private sector
12. Together these variables reflect the socio-economical and political situation 
in the municipality, which in turn could be associated with the underlying differences in the 
attitudes among citizens, doctors and/or personnel at the local insurance offices regarding the 
usage of the sickness insurance system.  
 
                                                 
9 The variable takes the value 1 if more than half of all voters in the municipality voted “yes“ to Swedish 
membership in the EU.  
10 This variable takes the value 1 if the socialist parties received more votes than the non-socialist ones in at least 
two of the three elections held in 1994, 1998 and 2002.  
11 This variable takes the value 1 if the municipality is belonging to one of the three metropolitan areas in 
Sweden.  
12  This variable takes the value 1 if more than 50 per cent of all incomes in the municipality come from the 
private sector.  
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  The results in the EU-referendum revealed large differences in voting patterns between 
southern and northern Sweden and between rural and urban areas. Political scientists have 
interpreted this geographical variation as partly reflecting the degree of political and 
economical marginalization felt by the citizens (Gilljan 1996). In other words, the further 
away the citizens felt they were from the political and economical centers, the more skeptical 
to the EU they were.  In marginalized areas the dependency of the public transfer systems is 
typically large (Frykman and Hansen 2005) and voting patterns in the referendum may hence 
serve as a proxy for differences in the usage of the welfare system. The socialist parties 
traditionally advocate more generous transfer systems than the non-socialist ones. To the 
extent that voting patterns reflect self-interests or family concerns (Seymore 1981), the 
outcomes in the national elections provide an indication of differences in the usage of the 
welfare system. Population density and share of income coming from the private sector both 
serve as measures of the dynamics of the municipality. Densely populated areas and/or areas 
with a large share of the citizens’ incomes coming from the private sector are usually 
characterized by both population growth and economic growth. According to widely held 
opinions people in these areas are both hard working and very conscious of their personal 
responsibilities (Selander 2005). The welfare system is expected to be less utilized in these 
areas.  
 
On the basis of the above discussed variables Sweden’s 290 municipalities are divided into 16 
regions. Out of these 16 regions four regions, representing 204 out of 290 municipalities and 
approximately 75 per cent of Sweden’s population aged 25-55, were large enough to be 
included in the analysis.
13  
 
As can be seen in Table 1 Region 1 consists of 30 municipalities, all located in Sweden’s 
three metropolitan regions (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö). More than half of the incomes 
of the citizens in these municipalities came from the private sector, more than half of the 
voters voted yes in the EU-referendum and the non-socialist parties received more votes than 
the socialist ones. The average sick rate in Region 1 is 21.4 days for men and 30.7 days for 
women. Region 2 contains 25 municipalities outside the metropolitan regions, all located in 
the southern part of Sweden. Less than half of the citizens’ incomes in these municipalities 
came from the private sector, more than half of the voters voted yes in the EU-referendum and 
                                                 
13 A full presentation of all municipalities in each of the four clusters is found in Appendix 2. 
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the non-socialist parties received more votes than the socialist ones. The average sick rate in 
Region 2 is 22.0 days for men and 34.2 days for women respectively. Region 3 contains 32 
municipalities outside  the metropolitan regions, all located in the southern part of Sweden 
Less than half of the incomes of the citizens in these municipalities came from the private 
sector, more than half of the voters voted yes in the EU-referendum and the socialist parties 
received more votes than the non-socialist ones. In Region 3 the average sick rate is 23.6 days 
for men and 37.3 days for women. Finally, Region 4 holds 117 municipalities. A majority of 
these is found in the northern part of Sweden. Less than half of the citizens’ incomes in these 
municipalities came from the private sector, more than half of the voters voted no in the EU-
referendum and the socialist parties received more votes than the non-socialist ones. The 
average sick rate in Region 4 amounts to 26.3 days for men and 41.2 for women. 
 
Table 1: Region characteristics  










> 50  % of  in-
come from 





1 30  Metropolitan  area  Yes  Non-
Socialist 
Yes  30.7 (W) 
21.4 (M)  




No 34.2  (W) 
22.0 (M) 
3 32  Non-metropolitan 
area 
Yes Socialist  No  37.3  (W) 
23.6 (M) 
4 117  Non-Metropolitan 
area 
No Socialist   
 
No 41.2  (W) 
26.3(M) 
1. Calculations based on individuals age 25-55.  
 
Taken together Region 2 and Region 3 are similar to each other with respect to municipality 
characteristics, while Region 1 and Region 4 are each other’s opposites. Region 4 has higher 
average sick rates compared to all other Regions. The difference in average sick rates is 
largest between Region 1 and Region 4.  
 
 
The number of movers across and within regions during the time period 1996 to 1998 is 





Table 2: Movers across and within regions 
                  To 
From 
Region 1  Region 2  Region 3  Region 4 
Region 1  35 970 (F) 
42 567 (M) 
1 828 (F) 
1 800 (M) 
2 105 (F) 
2 187 (M) 
 3 319 (F) 
 3 323 (M) 
Region 2    3 232 (F) 
 4 001 (M) 
2 372 (F) 
2 728 (M) 
1 540 (F) 
1 957 (M) 
    588 (F) 
    721 (M) 
 
Region 3      927 (F) 
 1 117(M) 
   568  (F) 
   604 (M) 
1 284 (F) 
1 641 (M) 
    724 (F) 
    833 (M) 
 
Region 4  4 707 (F) 
6 019 (M) 
1 757 (F) 
1 957 (M) 
3 482 (F) 
3 781 (M) 
16 932 (F) 
19 213 (M) 
 
 
The number of movers within Region 2 and Region 3, respectively, is quite small. In some 
cases there are even fewer movers within a region than across regions. In order for matching 
on the propensity score to be tenable a large number of non-treated observations are needed 
(Bryson et al. 2002).  Since that is not the case for Region 2 and Region 3, no analysis is 
performed for movers from these two regions.  
 
4.4 Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 and Table 4 show individual characteristics of 
individuals that move within one of the defined regions and those who move across regions. 
One of the most striking differences is that for Region 1, movers within the region have fewer 
average days of sickness related absence as compared to those who move to other regions. 
The opposite is true for Region 4, i.e. movers within Region 4 have more average days of 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics for women 
  Movers





































































0.44  0.46  0.41 0.40 0.40 0.41  0.56  0.52
Children 
(1 = children 
living at home) 
0.30  0.32  0.32 0.35 0.35 0.28  0.41  0.40
Education 
(1 = post 
secondary) 
0.45  0.46  0.46 0.40 0.30 0.50  0.41  0.32

















(1 = period of 
unemployment) 
0.20  0.25  0.30 0.31 0.39 0.41  0.37  0.38
Sector  
(1 = working in 
private sector) 
0.58  0.48  0.44 0.44 0.34 0.40  0.29  0.31
Immigrant 
(1 = born 
abroad) 
0.19  0.14  0.16 0.13 0.11 0.25  0.25  0.25
No of 
observations 











































































(1 = married/ 
cohabitation) 
0.42  0.44  0.39 0.39 0.40 0.37  0.51  0.49
Children 
(1 = children 
living at home) 
0.22  0.23  0.22 0.23 0.21 0.16  0.29  0.27
Education 
(1 = post 
secondary) 
0.43  0.47  0.45 0.37 0.27 0.50  0.43  0.33

















(1 = period of 
unemployment) 
0.21  0.23  0.28 0.32 0.40 0.42  0.35  0.36
Sector  
(1 = working in 
private sector) 
0.74  0.62  0.61 0.60 0.61 0.56  0.49  0.56
Immigrant 
(1 = born 
abroad) 
0.22  0.19  0.18 0.14 0.10 0.24  0.25  0.23
No of 
observations 




5 Empirical application and results 
 
5.1 Estimation of the propensity score  
The propensity score, i.e. the probability of moving from one region to another conditional on 
a set of variables is given by 
 
( ) () 1 , 1 , , 1 − − = = t i t i t i Z F Z D P  
 
where   denotes moving from one region to another in time period   and    is a 
vector of individual, family and municipality characteristics in the time period before moving. 
The variables included in   are variables believed to affect both the decision of moving 
from one region to another and the sickness related absence. The choice of what variables to 
1 , = t i D t 1 , − t i Z
1 , − t i Z
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include is motivated by the literature regarding determinants of domestic moves and regarding 
determinants of sickness absence. Empirical results in migration studies show that certain 
individual, family and regional characteristics influence short and long moves differently (see 
Nivalainen (2004) for a review). A high level of education, good health status and 
unemployment in the family are factors predicted to increase the likelihood of long distance 
moves, while old age, children and living in a large town raises the probability of short 
distance moves. Age, previous health status, being born abroad, family status, 
unemployment/employment and educational level are factors also known to be determinants 
of absence (see Alexanderson and Norlund 2003 for a review). Taken together the covariates 
used to estimate the propensity score are age, log of disposable family income, log of 
municipality population, dummy variable indicating marriage/cohabitation, dummy variable 
indicating children in the family, dummy variable indicating working in the private sector, 
dummy variable indicating post-secondary education, dummy variable indication being born 
abroad, dummy variable indicating period of unemployment and days of sickness related absence. 
All covariates are measured at time  1 − t   and in all cases we use a probit model to estimate the 
propensity scores. To the extent that higher orders of the covariates improve the balancing 
between movers across regions and movers within regions, they are included in the propensity 
score model.  
 
5.2 Matching and balancing tests 
Matching is performed using the nearest neighbor matching technique. This technique implies 
that each individual in the treatment group is matched with the observation in the control 
group having the closest resemblance in terms of the estimated propensity score. Matching is 
made with replacement.   
 
In order to get a sense of how successful the matching has been in terms of balancing the 
differences in covariates between movers across regions and movers within regions a number 
of balancing tests are performed. For each covariate entering the propensity score model 
paired t-tests are carried out in order to establish that no significant differences exist between 
the treated and the controls once matching has been performed. The standardized bias over all 
covariates is also examined, both before and after matching. If the matching is successful the 
standardized bias should decrease significantly. Finally, the pseudo 
2 R  before and after 
matching are compared to each other. A low 
2 R  after matching indicates that no difference in 




The paired t-tests show no significant difference for any of the covariates entering the 
propensity score once matching is performed. The standardized biases before and after 
matching as well as the pseudo 
2 R  before and after matching are presented in Table 5 and 
Table 6. The standardized bias decreases by 82 to 96 per cent and the 
2 R  after matching drops 
to 0.003 or below. Taken together we conclude that the matching has balanced differences in 
covariates between the group of treated and the group of controls, both for men and women. 
 
5.3 Difference-in-differences matching estimates  
Estimation is based on the DiD matching estimator. The results for women and men are 
presented in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. The estimates correspond to the average effect 
on sickness related absence of moving from one region to another as compared to moving 
within the original region. It should be noted that a significant treatment effect could be 
interpreted as different propensities for individuals to become absent across regions as well as 
geographical differences in the duration of absence spells for those individuals that utilize the 
sickness insurance system.  
 
The results for women, presented in Table 5, give only limited support of an effect on the 
average number of sickness related absence of moving from Region 1 to either Region 2 or 
Region 3. In most years the change in average days of sickness related absence does not differ 
significantly between treated and controls. The effect of moving from Region1 to Region 4, 
however, is positive and significant in most years and the results indicate that the effect is 
increasing over time. For the groups of women that have moved from Region 4 there is a 
negative effect on the average days of sickness related absence in all cases. The magnitude of 
these estimates is also increasing over time. Worth noting is the overall change in pattern at 
the very end of the period. For most groups the increase in magnitude of the estimate has been 
reversed between the years 2004 and 2005, indicating smaller differences between treated and 






Table 5: DiD matching estimates, women  
  From Region1  From Region4 














































































































         
Balancing  indicators         
Mean  bias  before  10.172 12.377 12.356 21.134 16.136 15.251 
Mean  bias  after  1.522 1.471 2.210 1.192 1.600 1.625 
Pseudo  R2  before 0.020 0.025 0.046 0.093 0.042 0.051 
Pseudo  R2  after  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
        
O b s e r v a t i o n s         
Controls  35 970  35 970  35 970  16 932  16 932  16 932 
Treated -matched  1 828  2 105  3 319  4 707  1 757  3 482 
Analytically derived standard errors are shown in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical significance 
at the 1% ,  5%  and 10 % levels, respectively. 
 
The results for men, presented in Table 6, show a pattern similar to that for women. The 
results suggest that there is no significant effect on the average number of days of sickness 
related absence for men that move within Region 1 as compared to men that move to either 
Region 2 or Region 3. Moving from Region1 to Region 4 however yield a positive effect on 
the number of days of sickness related absence. For the groups of men that have moved from 
Region 4 there is a negative effect on sickness related absence. As in the case of women the 
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results indicate a break between the years 2004 and 2005. In two out of six cases the 
differences between treated and controls decrease between 2004 and 2005. 
 
Table 6: DiD matching estimates, men  
  From Region 1  From Region 4 







































































































        
Balancing  indicators        
Mean  bias  before  11.284 13.009 14.481 21.981 15.595 11.037 
Mean  bias  after  1.873 1.233 1.350 0.768 2.206 0.953 
Pseudo  R2  before 0.022 0.026 0.052 0.102 0.049 0.030 
Pseudo  R2  after  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
        
O b s e r v a t i o n s         
Untreated   42 567  42 567  42 567  19 213  19 213  19 213 
Treated  1 800  2 187  3 323  6 019  1 957  3 781 
Analytically derived standard errors are shown in parentheses. (***), (**) and (*) indicate statistical significance 





The results presented in Table 5 and Table 6 suggest that individuals that move between 
regions that are similar with respect to average sickness related absence (from Region1 to 
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Region 2 or Region 3) do not change their absence behavior as compared to individuals who 
move within the original region (Region 1). However, individuals who move to a region 
where the sickness related absence differ substantially from that in the original region (from 
Region 1 to Region 4 and from Region 4 to all other regions) do change their absence 
behavior. This holds for both men and women, but is more evident for women than for men. 
In line with predictions from the theoretical model in Lindbeck and Persson (2008) and with 
earlier empirical findings, e.g. Ichino and Maggi (2000) and Lindbeck et al. (2007), movers 
from regions with low (high) rates of absence to regions with high (low) rates increase 
(decrease) their sickness related absence as compared to those who move within the original 
region. The observed patterns are consistent with the idea that local cultures are important to 
individual sickness absence. One possible interpretation is that individuals adapt to the norms 
in their new environment. Moreover, the differences between movers across and within 
regions could be reflecting differences in norms and behavior of practicing physicians and 
SSIA officers. The results indicate that there is an immediate effect but that the effect is 
increasing over time
14. This corresponds well to our hypothesis that exposure to new norms 
among physicians and SSIA officers happens immediately after the move, but that individual 
adherence to new norms and a new culture takes some time. As noted earlier, our results point 
towards that there is a change in the pattern at the very end of the period. For many groups 
that have had an increase in magnitude of the estimate prior to the year 2005, the magnitude 
has instead decreased between the years 2004 and 2005.  In January 2005 the SSIAs changed 
from being locally independent to being one centralized agency. As a consequence, the 
decisions regarding individual work capacity were no longer made locally but at the 
centralized agency and the guidelines for implementation of rules regarding sickness absence 
were no longer under influence of local norms. We believe that the decrease in magnitude is a 
consequence of this change.  
 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that when evaluating medium or long-term treatment effects using propensity score 
matching there is a risk that systematic changes in individual characteristics between treated and controls, that 
take place after the time of matching and that are affecting the growth path of the outcome variable, might bias 
the results. In order to check if it is likely that this is a problem in our study we have investigated the time 
varying variables in our propensity score model. There are some differences in the development of time variant 
variables between the groups of treated and controls. In Region 1, at the end of the evaluation period, individuals 
are to a larger extent employed within the privates sector, have fewer kids and have a higher average income 
compared to individuals in all other clusters. This holds for movers both within Region 1 and movers to Region 
1. The differences in the mentioned variables across Region 2, Region 3 and Region 4, on the other hand, are 





There are other possible explanations to our results. For instance, one could argue that there 
are health related issues such as differences in temperature and levels of pollution that could 
have caused the observed patterns to appear. There is however, one feature of the results that 
indicates that this is not the case. As previously noted there is a break in the patterns of 
estimates between the years 2004 and 2005. It does not seem likely that this break can be 
explained by changes in health related factors but that it is instead, as pointed out above, a 
consequence of changes in the institutional setting of the sickness insurance. Consequently, 
there is no reason to believe that the results prior to 2005 reflect (at least not primarily) health 
related factors. 
 
In conclusion, the overall pattern of our results indicates that the region of residence is 
important to the individual sickness related absence. We interpret this as an indication of the 
difference in praxis regarding the utilization of the sickness insurance system across regions 
in Sweden. Furthermore, we cannot rule out the possibility that the patterns are caused by 
local cultures regarding sickness absence and the existence of a so called “cultural illness”.   
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Appendix 1: The Swedish sickness insurance system
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The two most important parts of the Swedish sickness insurance system are the sick leave 
insurance and the disability pension insurance. T 
 
The sick leave insurance 
The Swedish sick leave insurance system is mandatory and covers all employed and self-
employed workers in Sweden. The insurance system provides economic compensation in the 
event of work incapacity that amounts to at least a quarter of full time. An individual can 
receive sickness benefits corresponding to 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of full time depending 
on his/her health status. The responsibility of providing economic compensation in the case 
of sickness is shared between the employer and the Swedish government. The first part of the 
sickness spell, labeled the sick-pay period, is paid for by the employer. (No compensation is 
paid the first day of the sickness spell. This is the so called waiting period.) The government 
is responsible for providing benefits for any additional time of sickness absence. The money 
paid by the Swedish government is mediated via the Swedish Social Insurance Agency 
(SSIA). Up to a certain limit, the sickness benefit corresponds to a certain share, i.e. the 
replacement rate, of the individual monthly salary. Above the cap, the compensation is fixed 
to the amount of the limit. In addition to benefits paid by SSIA, blue collar workers and 
municipality/county employees receive supplementary compensation from their employers 
through their collective bargaining.  
 
During the time period 1995 to 2005 certain changes were made regarding replacement rates, 
the length of the sick pay period and supplementary compensation through collective 
bargaining. For most of the time period the sick-pay period was 14 days and the replacement 
rate was 80 per cent. From January 1 1996 to 31 of December the 1997 the replacement rate 
was lowered to 75 per cent and in 1997 and the first quarter of 1998 the sick-pay period was 
extended to 28 days. From July 1 2003 to 31 of December 2004 the sick-pay period was 
extended to 21 days and during the same time the replacement rate was lowered to 77.6 per 
cent. Before 1998 the collective bargain added 10 per cent of the normal wage to blue collar 
workers and municipality/county employees between the time the government becomes 
responsible for providing sick leave compensation to the 90
th day of the sick spell. From Jan 1 
1998 the extra 10 per cent in income loss compensation is paid between day 91 and day 360.  
 
The disability pension insurance 
Before 2003 individuals that permanently had lost their capacity to work by at least a quarter 
were eligible for disability pension. Depending on how much the work capacity was reduced 
disability pension could be full, three-quarter, half or a quarter. Disability pension was an 
income related benefit.  The compensation was based on assumed income until normal 
retirement age. In 2003 the disability pension insurance was changed into “activity 
compensation” and “sickness compensation”. Activity compensation is for individuals aged 
19 to 29 while sickness compensation is for individuals aged 30 to 64. The basic features of 
the disability pension, described above, remained the same.  
 
                                                 
15 Hesselius P. Work Absence and Social Security in Sweden. Manuscript, book chapter. Institute for Labour 
Market Evaluation and Department of Economics, Uppsala University, 2006. 
http://www.sns.se/document/nber2_ph.pdf (accessed 21 January 2008) 
  
 
Appendix 2: Lists of municipalities in regions 
 
Municipalities are presented in order of their municipality-code.   
 
Region 1: Vallentuna, Österåker, Värmdö, Järfälla, Ekerö, Huddinge, Salem, Tyresö, Täby, 
Danderyd, Sollentuna, Stockholm, Nacka, Solna, Lidingö, Vaxholm, Sigtuna, Staffanstorp, 
Vellinge, Lomma, Kungsbacka, Härryda, Partille, Öckerö, Stenungsund, Tjörn, Lerum, 
Göteborg, Mölndal, Kungälv. 
 
Region 2: Uppsala, Enköping, Strängnäs, Linköping, Söderköping, Jönköping, Mörbylånga, 
Borgholm, Skurup, Sjöbo, Hörby, Höör, Tomelilla, Klippan, Båstad, Simrishamn, 
Ängelholm, Hässleholm, Laholm, Falkenberg, Varberg, Sotenäs, Grästorp, Essunga, 
Ulricehamn. 
 
Region 3: Nyköping, Flen, Katrineholm, Eskilstuna, Norrköping, Motala, Vadstena, Mjölby, 
Växjö, Kalmar, Gotland, Sölvesborg, Svalöv, Östra Göinge, Landskrona, Eslöv, Ystad, 
Kristianstad, Halmstad, Borås, Mariestad, Lidköping, Skara, Skövde, Hammarö, Karlstad, 
Örebro, Karlskoga, Kungsör, Hallstahammar, Köping, Arboga.  
 
Region 4: Älvkarlebyn, Tierp, Vingåker, Gnesta, Boxholm, Åtvidaberg, Valdemarsvik, 
Nässjö, Tranås, Högsby, Hultsfred, Mönsterås, Nybro, Västervik, Karlskrona, Ronneby, 
Karlshamn, Munkedal, Karlsborg, Gullspång, Bengtfors, Mark, Tibro, Töreboda, Lysekil, 
Uddevalla, Strömstad, Vänersborg, Åmål, Tidaholm, Kil, Eda, Torsby, Storfors, Munkfors, 
Forshaga, Kristinehamn, Filipstad, Hagfors, Arvika, Säffle, Laxå, Hallsberg, Degerfors, 
Hällefors, Ljusnarsberg, Kumla, Askersund, Nora, Lindesberg, Skinnskatteberg, 
Surahammar, Norberg, Sala, Fagersta, Vansbro, Malung-Sälen, Gagnef, Orsa, Älvdalen, 
Smedjebacken, Mora, Falun, Borlänge, Säter, Hedemora, Avesta, Ludvika, Ockelbo, Hofors, 
Ovanåker, Nordanstig, Ljusdal, Gävle, Söderhamn, Bollnäs, Hudiksvall, Ånge, Timrå, 
Härnösand, Sundsvall, Kramfors, Sollefteå, Örnsköldsvik, Ragunda, Bräcke, Krokom, 
Strömsund, Åre, Berg, Härjedalen, Nordmaling, Robertsfors, Norsjö, Malå, Storuman, 
Sorsele, Dorotea, Vännäs, Vilhelmina, Åsele, Umeå, Lycksele, Skellefteå, Arvidsjaur, 
Arjeplog, Jokkmokk, Överkalix, Kalix, Övertorneå, Pajala, Gällivare, Älvsbyn, Luleå, Piteå, 
Haparanda, Kiruna. 
  